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PATIENT MOBILITY DIRECTIVE: 
ONE STEP FORWARD OR TWO STEPS BACK 
FOR CROSS-BORDER HEALTHCARE?
Tomislav Sokol, Ljerka Mintas Hodak, Ana AbramoviÊ∗
Summary: The European Parliament and the Council of the Europe-
an Union adopted on 9 March 2011 the Directive on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. This Directive emerged 
as a result of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on social securi-
ty coverage of healthcare obtained outside the Member State where 
the patient has social security protection. The aim of this paper is 
to investigate the Directive and determine whether it will add (once 
transposed into national legal systems) to the current set of patient 
entitlements and make it easier for patients to obtain socially covered 
healthcare outside the state of social protection, and to discuss the 
Directive’s application in Croatia once the country joins the EU. The 
paper analyses the Patient Mobility Directive by focusing on the is-
sue of whether the Directive actually contributes to patient mobility in 
the EU and also its relationship with national social security legisla-
tion, especially in Croatia. The paper argues that the Patient Mobility 
Directive’s impact on the actual movement of patients across borders 
might prove to be counterproductive in some areas, due to its limiting 
certain entitlements to access socially covered healthcare abroad. On 
the other hand, the Directive will also add to some patients’ entitle-
ments in accessing healthcare abroad and improve (from the patients’ 
point of view) certain aspects of the overall framework for obtaining 
cross-border healthcare. Therefore, the Directive’s impact in terms of 
facilitating patients’ ability to obtain socially covered healthcare out-
side the Member State of social protection remains ambivalent.
1 Introduction
A body of case law has been established in recent years by the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice concerning freedom to receive healthcare treat-
ment outside one’s state of social protection (the competent state), based 
on the internal market free movement rules of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU). The crucial issue this 
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case law touches upon is whether such healthcare treatment should be 
paid for by the state of protection, and under what conditions. The ap-
proach of the Court has placed the emphasis on giving patients addi-
tional possibilities of cover compared to the already existing regulations 
on the co-ordination of social security systems that have regulated the 
ﬁ eld for decades. These judgments have also created certain ambiguities 
concerning different aspects of the described cross-border healthcare, 
with several problems hampering patients’ free movement.
The case law and its casuistic approach made it necessary to de-
velop a coherent legal instrument to clarify patients’ rights when ac-
cessing healthcare abroad. As a result of this necessity, the Directive on 
the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (hereinafter 
the Patient Mobility Directive) entered into force on 24 April 2011.1 The 
Directive’s purpose was to codify the case law. In addition, this piece of 
secondary EU legislation also regulates certain aspects of cross-border 
healthcare not deﬁ ned by the case law. The described development is 
signiﬁ cant from the Croatian perspective, because of the country’s ap-
proaching accession to the Union and the need to adapt its legal frame-
work to EU rules.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the Patient Mobility Directive 
from the viewpoint of the patient and his/her rights, and to determine 
whether these rights have been strengthened or weakened (or neither) 
by the new Directive when compared to the co-ordination regulations 
and case law applying the Treaty, and also how the Directive will inﬂ u-
ence Croatian regulation of healthcare obtained abroad once the country 
joins the Union. For the purpose of this article, the notion of ‘healthcare’ 
is deﬁ ned as including all activities aimed at restoring and maintaining 
health in the best possible way, soothing pain and making health dis-
orders more bearable by any other means. Patient entitlements are un-
derstood as the legal possibilities for patients to access socially covered 
(essentially state-funded) healthcare outside the Member State in which 
they are socially protected (whose social security healthcare system they 
are a subject of).
The paper begins with the description of the Patient Mobility Direc-
tive, describing its most important provisions, and is separated into two 
sections. The ﬁ rst deals with the rules on social security coverage of 
healthcare treatment obtained outside the patient’s state of social pro-
tection, which to a certain extent represent a codiﬁ cation of the case law 
of the Court of Justice. The second deals with the Directive’s provisions 
which do not codify existing case law, but which represent a new de-
1  Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 
on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45.
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velopment, improving patients’ access to cross-border healthcare within 
the EU.
The subsequent section ﬁ rst discusses the aspects of the Directive 
which represent a step forward in terms of possibilities for patients to ac-
cess socially covered healthcare outside their state of social protection. It 
then discusses the aspects of the Directive which represent a step back-
wards in these terms. Finally, an analysis of the Croatian legal frame-
work is used to highlight the positive and negative sides of the Directive 
regarding patients’ opportunities to access socially covered cross-border 
healthcare. 
2 The Patient Mobility Directive
2.1 Codiﬁ cation of reimbursement rules?
Since the beginning of the integration process, cases of people ac-
cessing socially covered healthcare outside their state of social security 
protection have been regulated by the regulations on co-ordination of 
social security systems, in order to facilitate the free movement of per-
sons (initially only the economically active).2 This system has been sig-
2  Regulation (EEC) 3 of the Council of 25 September 1958 on social security for migrant 
workers [1958] OJ 30/561 (originally: Réglement 3 concernant la sécurité sociale des tra-
vailleurs migrants, last amended by Règlement (CEE) n° 419/68 du Conseil, du 5 avril 
1968, modiﬁ ant et complétant certaines dispositions des règlements n° 3 et 4 concernant 
la sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants OJ L87/1); succeeded by Regulation (EEC) 
1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L149/2, last 
amended by Regulation (EC) 592/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their 
families moving within the Community [2008] OJ L177/1 (hereinafter Regulation 1408/71); 
currently regulated by Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1, 
last amended by Regulation (EU) 465/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 May 2012 amending Regulation EC No 883/2004 on the coordination of social securi-
ty systems and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 [2012] OJ 
L149/4 (hereinafter Regulation 883/2004) and Regulation (EC) 987/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for imple-
menting Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] 
OJ L284/1, last amended by Regulation (EU) 465/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2012 amending Regulation EC No 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
[2012] OJ L149/4 (hereinafter Regulation 987/2009). See also F Marhold, ‘Modernisation of 
European Coordination of Sickness Beneﬁ ts’ (2009) 11 European Journal of Social Security 
119; F Pennings, ‘Introduction: Regulation 883/2004 - The Third Coordination Regulation 
in a Row’ (2009) 11 European Journal of Social Security 3; Y Jorens and F Van Overmeiren, 
‘General Principles of Coordination in Regulation 883/2004’ (2009) 11 European Journal of 
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niﬁ cantly affected by the European Court of Justice, which since 1998 
has rendered several judgments dealing with patients accessing socially 
covered healthcare outside their state of social protection (mainly deal-
ing with planned healthcare, when a person travels abroad for the spe-
ciﬁ c purpose of obtaining healthcare,3 but also dealing with unplanned 
healthcare in certain instances).4 These judgments have been based on 
the Court directly applying the free movement provisions of the Treaty 
in the given area (mostly the free movement of services). Since the case 
law has been covered in detail by the legal literature, this paper will not 
engage in a further analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence.5 Instead, the 
Social Security 47; P Schoukens and D Pieters, ‘The Rules within Regulation 883/2004 for 
Determining the Applicable Legislation’ (2009) 11 European Journal of Social Security 81.
3  Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR 
I-1831 on free movement of goods; Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des Caisses 
de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance 
nationale des mutualités chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-157/99 B.S.M. 
Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and HTM Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep 
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 VG Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waar-
borgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and EEM van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaat-
schappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-56/01 Patricia Inizan v Caisse 
primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2003] ECR I-12403; Case C-496/01 
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2004] ECR I-2351; Case C-
8/02 Ludwig Leichtle v Bundesantstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-2641; Case C-372/04 The 
Queen on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of State 
for Health [2006] ECR I-4325; Case C-466/04 Manuel Acereda Herrera v Servicio Cántabro 
de Salud [2006] ECR I-5341; Case C-444/05 Aikaterini Stamatelaki v NPDD Organismos 
Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE) [2007] ECR I-3185; Case C-512/08 European 
Commission v French Republic [2010] ECR I-8833; Case C-173/09 Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v 
Natsionalna zdravnoosiguritelna kasa [2011] ECR I-8889; Case C-490/09 European Com-
mission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [2011] ECR I-247; Case C-255/09 European Commis-
sion v Portuguese Republic (ECJ 27 October 2011).
4  Case C-211/08 European Commission v Kingdom of Spain [2010] ECR I-5267.
5  See, for instance, P Cabral, ‘Cross-border Medical Care in the European Union: Bringing 
down a First Wall’ (1999) 24 EL Rev 387; P Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the Right to 
Cross Border Medical Care’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 673; M Cousins, ‘Patient Mobility and Na-
tional Health Systems’ (2007) 34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 183; M Flear, ‘Case 
C-385/99 V. G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij O.Z. Zorgverzekeringen 
U.A. and E.E.M van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Z.A.O. Zorgverzekeringen, 
Judgement of the Court of 13 May 2003’ (case note) (2004) 41 CML Rev 209; SL Greer, 
‘Migration of Patients and Migration of Power: Politics and Policy Consequences of Patient 
Mobility in Europe’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 908; VG Hatzopoulos, 
‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but Healing Patients? The European Market 
for Health Care Services after the Judgements of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’ 
(2002) 39 CML Rev 683; V Hatzopoulos, ‘Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU’ in G 
de Burca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (OUP 2005); A Kaczo-
rowska, ‘A Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the Right to Effective 
and Speedy Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 345; 
K Lenaerts and T Heremans ‘Contours of a European Social Union in the Case-Law of the 
European Court of Justice’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 101; C Newdick, 
‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding 
Social Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645; C Newdick, ‘Disrupting the Community: Saving 
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case law will be mentioned to the extent necessary to explain the actual 
contribution of the Directive to patients’ rights and possibilities to access 
socially covered healthcare outside the competent state.
The case law has created the necessity for codiﬁ cation into a coher-
ent and transparent legal framework. This endeavour has had to balance 
patients’ rights to cross-border healthcare with the historical compe-
tences of Member States, different healthcare models and protection of 
the ﬁ nancial stability of national social security systems.6 Within this 
balancing exercise, it has been necessary to ﬁ nd solutions to the de-
scribed problems emanating from the case law.
The Patient Mobility Directive was adopted on the basis of TFEU 
article 114 (former EC Treaty article 95) on the harmonisation of the in-
ternal market, through ordinary legislative procedure, and TFEU article 
168 (former EC Treaty article 152), according to which ‘a high level of 
human health protection shall be ensured in the deﬁ nition and imple-
mentation of all Union policies and activities.’ Adoption took place almost 
three years after the initial proposal by the Commission, which shows 
the complexity and political sensitivity of the subject matter.7 
The use of the above-mentioned Treaty provisions is logical, since 
the Directive is based on the applicability of the internal market Treaty 
provisions to social security cover of cross-border healthcare. The use of 
the legal basis also demonstrates that cross-border healthcare does not 
fall under the complementary EU competences, as one might conclude 
after reading TFEU articles 153 and 168 in conjunction with TFEU ar-
Public Health Ethics from the EU Internal Market’, in JW van de Gronden, E Szyszczak, 
U Neergaard and M Krajewski (eds), Health Care and EU Law (TMC Asser Press 2011); 
C Newdick ‘The European Court of Justice, Trans-National Health Care, and Social Citi-
zenship: Accidental Death of a Concept?’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
844; H Nys, ‘Comparative Health Law and the Harmonization of Patients’ Rights in Europe’ 
(2001) 8 European Journal of Health Law 317; F Pennings, ‘The Cross-border Health Care 
Directive: More Free Movement for Citizens and more Coherent EU Law?’ (2011) 13 Euro-
pean Journal of Social Security 424; JW van de Gronden, ‘Cross-Border Health Care in the 
EU and the Organization of the National Health Care Systems of the Member States: The 
Dynamics Resulting from the European Court of Justice’s Decisions on Free Movement 
and Competition Law’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 705; AP Van der Mei, 
‘Cross-border Access to Healthcare and Entitlement to Complementary “Vanbraekel reim-
bursement”’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 431; AP Van der Mei, ‘Cross-Border Access to Health Care 
within the European Union: Recent Developments in Law and Policy’ (2003) 10 European 
Journal of Health Law 369. 
6  S de La Rosa, ‘The Directive on Cross-border Healthcare or the Art of Codifying Complex 
Case Law’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 15, 18.
7  Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care’ COM (2008) 414 ﬁ nal, 02 
July 2008 (hereinafter Original Proposal). The Patient Mobility Directive must be trans-
posed into Member States’ legislation by 25 October 2013. See Patient Mobility Directive 
(n 1) art21.
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ticles 4 and 6, but instead under the internal market competence, which 
is shared between the Union and the Member States according to TFEU 
article 6 (the same holds true for the aspects of cross-border healthcare 
covered by the co-ordination regulations, which are also based on inter-
nal market Treaty provisions).
The Directive’s personal scope of application includes those persons 
who are subject to EU social security co-ordination, including persons 
who are not Union nationals. It also applies to third-country nationals 
who fulﬁ l the conditions of the state of afﬁ liation (the competent state) for 
entitlement to healthcare.8
The Directive covers cross-border healthcare, which is deﬁ ned in a 
broad manner, without making any distinction on the basis of its private 
or public (social) nature. E-health, whereby the service is provided with-
out the patient actually crossing a border to access a provider established 
in another Member State, is also covered.9 However, long-term care for 
the purpose of assisting people with daily tasks, access to and allocation 
of organs for transplant purposes, and public vaccination programmes 
against infectious diseases which are exclusively aimed at protecting the 
health of the population on the territory of a Member State and which 
are subject to speciﬁ c planning and implementation measures, are not 
covered by the Directive. 10 
It must be emphasised that the co-ordination rules dealing with 
healthcare include long-term care within their scope of application, 
while the case law concerning the application of the Treaty’s free-provi-
sion-of-services rules on long-term care is rather ambiguous. However, 
8  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) arts 3 and 7. The co-ordination rules apply to Member 
State nationals; third-country nationals residing and moving within the EU (except Den-
mark, while the old rules apply to the UK); stateless persons and refugees residing and 
moving within the EU; their family members and survivors. The co-ordination rules also 
apply to survivors (of persons who have been subject to a Member State’s legislation) who 
are Member State nationals, stateless persons or refugees residing in a Member State. See 
to this effect Council Regulation (EC) 859/2003 of 14 May 2003 extending the provisions 
of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 to nationals of third 
countries who are not already covered by those provisions solely on the ground of their 
nationality [2003] OJ L124/1; Regulation (EU) 1231/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 November 2010 extending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regula-
tion (EC) No 987/2009 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by these 
Regulations solely on the ground of their nationality [2010] OJ L344/1; and Regulation 
883/2004 (n 2) art 2.
9  See Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) arts 3 and 7 and the Preamble to the Patient Mobility 
Directive (n 1) para 26. Healthcare is deﬁ ned as ‘health services provided by health profes-
sionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore their state of health, including the pre-
scription, dispensation and provision of medicinal products and medical devices’.
10  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 1(3); Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) Chapter IV (arts 
10-15). 
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since remuneration in the state of treatment is the crucial criterion for 
the applicability of the free movement of services (when a patients pays 
the foreign healthcare provider directly for the treatment, and claims 
reimbursement from the competent state), there is no reason why long-
term care should generally be excluded from the application of the Treaty 
rules, when remuneration (actual payment for the treatment in question) 
exists.11
It seems that the Patient Mobility Directive does not apply to cases 
where a person obtains (health)care while residing (without a foreseeable 
limit to the duration of that residence) outside the state of afﬁ liation. 
This conclusion is based on the fact that free-movement-of-services rules 
are not applicable to the described residence situations, according to 
the Court of Justice, to whose jurisprudence the Directive refers.12 Since 
TFEU article 114 can only be used to harmonise the internal market, 
and is not applicable to the free movement of persons according to TFEU 
article 114(2), it can be argued that this legal basis could not be used to 
adopt measures relating to healthcare obtained in a state of residence 
outside the state of afﬁ liation mentioned above. It seems that the Patient 
Mobility Directive is applicable to cases where a person obtains health-
care while staying temporarily outside the state of afﬁ liation, since no 
explicit distinction is made by the provision of the Patient Mobility Direc-
tive between planned and unplanned healthcare. 
The Member State of afﬁ liation is deﬁ ned as the state which is com-
petent to give prior authorisation for obtaining socially covered health-
care in another Member State under the co-ordination rules. In the case 
that no Member State is competent for third-country nationals on the 
basis of the co-ordination rules, the Member State of insurance or the 
Member State granting the right to sickness beneﬁ ts will be the state of 
afﬁ liation.13 Since, according to Regulation 883/2004, planned health-
care which is obtained by a pensioner in a Member State which is not 
his/her state of residence is covered by the state of residence if that 
11  Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 1(va); See also Pennings (n 5) 438, Case C-208/07 Petra 
von Chamier-Glisczinski v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse [2009] ECR I-6095 paras 
75- 77 and Case C-562/10 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany (ECJ 12 
July 2012) paras 40-63. According to the latter case, it seems the reliance on care escapes 
the free provision of services, at least as the latter has been applied in cases starting with 
Kohll (n 3). See also Case C-70/95 Sodemare SA, Anni Azzurri Holding SpA and Anni Azzurri 
Rezzato Srl v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-3395 paras 23-35 concerning the right of 
establishment.
12  Von Chamier-Glisczinski (n 11) paras 75- 77. See also, for example, Preamble to the 
Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) para 8. It remains questionable whether the Directive could 
apply to cases where a person resides outside his/her state of afﬁ liation while he/she exer-
cises the right of establishment in the state of afﬁ liation.
13  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 3.
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state has opted for reimbursement based on ﬁ xed amounts,14 the Mem-
ber State of residence provides authorisation in the described situation.15 
Concerning this issue, the Patient Mobility Directive provides that:
if a Member State is listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
and in compliance with that Regulation has recognised the rights to 
sickness beneﬁ ts for pensioners and the members of their families, 
being resident in a different Member State, it shall provide them 
healthcare under this Directive at its own expense when they stay 
on its territory, in accordance with its legislation, as though the per-
sons concerned were residents in the Member State listed in that 
Annex.16
Therefore, a Belgian pensioner living in Spain who obtains health 
treatment in Belgium (which is listed in Annex IV) will be covered by 
Belgium.
In addition: 
if the healthcare provided in accordance with this Directive is not 
subject to prior authorisation, is not provided in accordance with 
Chapter 1 of Title III of the Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, and is 
provided in the territory of the Member State that according to that 
Regulation and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 is, in the end, respon-
sible for reimbursement of the costs, the costs shall be assumed 
by that Member State. This Member State may assume the costs of 
the healthcare in accordance with the terms, conditions, criteria of 
eligibility and regulatory and administrative formalities that it has 
established, provided that these are compatible with the TFEU.17
This provision could be interpreted in such a way that the costs of 
healthcare for a person receiving a UK pension in Spain who travels to 
get non-hospital treatment in the UK, will be covered by the UK, since 
the latter State ultimately pays for the costs of the mentioned treatment 
within the co-ordination framework (the ﬁ xed amounts for reimbursing 
Spain include these costs).
A central part of the Directive deals with reimbursement rules, 
which determine in which situations the state of afﬁ liation is required to 
cover health treatment obtained by its socially covered patients outside 
its territory. The ﬁ rst important issue one must turn to is deﬁ ning the 
range of covered treatments. In this sense, the Directive has incorpo-
14  Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 27(5). 
15  Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 27(5). 
16  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(2).
17  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(2) and Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 17-35. 
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rated important parts of recent case law in its Preamble (paragraph 34), 
whereby the broad national deﬁ nitions of general healthcare coverage 
mean that the most effective foreign treatment which falls within the 
ambit of the deﬁ nitions must be paid for by the state of afﬁ liation, even 
if it is not available on its territory.18 
However, the autonomy of Member States in determining by them-
selves the general national basket of covered healthcare, including the 
right to do so not only via national statutes or statutory instruments but 
also at the regional or local level, has been acknowledged in the norma-
tive part of the Directive, and also that patients are only entitled to for-
eign health treatment which is part of the state of afﬁ liation’s package.19 
Read together, these provisions may be interpreted as giving more leeway 
to Member States than the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence. 
According to the Court of Justice, patients are generally entitled 
to planned healthcare abroad within the range of coverage deﬁ ned by 
the state of afﬁ liation. However, when the state of afﬁ liation uses broad 
categories (like ‘normal’ or ‘recognised’ treatments) to deﬁ ne the range 
of covered healthcare, patients are entitled to the most effective foreign 
treatments which may fall under these broad categories, even when these 
treatments are not available in the state of afﬁ liation. There is no explicit 
acknowledgment of the Member States’ freedom to limit the range of cov-
ered healthcare on the basis of local healthcare purchasers’ decisions 
rather than on the basis of national-level legislation.20 According to the 
Directive, on the other hand, national legislation which grants an ex-
plicit or implicit entitlement to local bodies that purchase healthcare to 
deﬁ ne signiﬁ cant parts of the healthcare coverage by themselves, can be 
interpreted as lawfully limiting healthcare to those treatments which are 
approved by these local bodies.
The next important consideration must be given to prior authorisa-
tion. Member States may impose prior authorisation to cover healthcare 
(abroad) which:
(a) is made subject to planning requirements relating to the object 
of ensuring sufﬁ cient and permanent access to a balanced range of 
high-quality treatment in the Member State concerned or to the wish 
to control costs and avoid, as far as possible, any waste of ﬁ nancial, 
technical and human resources and:
(i) involves overnight hospital accommodation of the patient in ques-
tion for at least one night; or
18  See Elchinov (n 3).
19  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7.
20  See Geraets-Smits (n 3) paras 85-98 and Elchinov (n 3) paras 63-73.
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(ii) requires use of highly specialised and cost-intensive medical in-
frastructure or medical equipment;
(b) involves treatments presenting a particular risk for the patient or 
the population; or
(c) is provided by a healthcare provider that, on a case-by-case basis, 
could give rise to serious and speciﬁ c concerns relating to the qual-
ity or safety of the care, with the exception of healthcare which is 
subject to Union legislation ensuring a minimum level of safety and 
quality throughout the Union.21
Member States must notify the Commission of the categories under 
a). In this way, Member States have a wider set of options to impose prior 
authorisation under the Directive than under the case law applying the 
Treaty. According to the case law, prior authorisation can be imposed 
for non-urgent hospital treatments and for treatments involving major 
medical equipment.22
If we look at the possible grounds for refusing authorisation, some 
interesting things can be observed. There is a closed list of grounds for 
refusal, some of which have been mentioned by the Court (a medically 
justiﬁ able time limit for the provision of healthcare),23 but some of which 
have not (public health risks, provider-related concerns and patient-safe-
ty risks). Provider-related concerns are especially interesting, since ac-
cording to free-movement jurisprudence, providers who are established 
in other Member States must be given all the guarantees that are given 
to domestic providers by the competent state. In other words, if a pro-
vider is allowed to practise medicine in the state of treatment, it is not up 
to the state of afﬁ liation (the competent state) to question that provider’s 
adequacy.24 
21  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 8(2).
22  See Commission v France C-512/08 (n 3) paras 27-42.
23  A Member State may refuse authorisation when ‘healthcare can be provided on its terri-
tory within a time limit which is medically justiﬁ able, taking into account the current state 
of health and the probable course of the illness of each patient concerned’, according to the 
Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 8(6).
24  A Member State may refuse authorisation when ‘a) the patient will, according to a clinical 
evaluation, be exposed with reasonable certainty to a patient-safety risk that cannot be re-
garded as acceptable, taking into account the potential beneﬁ t for the patient of the sought 
cross-border healthcare; (b) the general public will be exposed with reasonable certainty 
to a substantial safety hazard as a result of the cross-border healthcare in question;(c) 
this healthcare is to be provided by a healthcare provider that raises serious and speciﬁ c 
concerns relating to the respect of standards and guidelines on quality of care and patient 
safety, including provisions on supervision, whether these standards and guidelines are 
laid down by laws and regulations or through accreditation systems established by the 
Member State of treatment’, according to the Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 8(6). See 
also Kohll (n 3) para 48.
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It should be mentioned that the wording of the provision stating the 
cases in which prior authorisation may not be refused differs from the 
wording of the provision stating the cases in which authorisation may be 
refused. The former provision is based on case law, while the latter reiter-
ates the wording of the co-ordination rules dealing with the same issue. 
According to the case law directly applying the Treaty, prior authorisa-
tion can only be refused if the same or equally effective health treatment 
can be provided by domestic providers without undue delay. According 
to the co-ordination rules, prior authorisation must be granted when 
the treatment cannot be provided in the state of residence of the patient 
within a medically justiﬁ able time limit, taking into account the person’s 
current state of health and the probable course of his/her illness. Since 
the Court’s interpretations of the Treaty and of the co-ordination rules 
have been aligned in this respect, there should be no major legal problem 
stemming from the Directive (although, the case-law-based provision of 
the Directive omitted the inability to carry out a professional activity as 
a relevant criterion, which could cause problems, since it is mentioned 
by the case law).25 
The question remains as to whether prior authorisation can be ap-
plied in cases of unplanned healthcare (when someone is temporarily 
abroad for some purpose other than healthcare and breaks a leg or suf-
fers appendicitis, for instance). Although a logical answer would be in the 
negative, there is a possibility that it could become necessary for a per-
son to obtain healthcare which does not have to be provided right away 
while temporarily staying abroad in order to ﬁ nish a semester of study-
ing abroad, for example. Could prior authorisation be imposed in these 
cases? Under the case law applying the Treaty, the answer is no, and 
also under the co-ordination regulations.26 However, the Directive is not 
clear on this issue. As co-ordination regulations remain applicable, the 
Directive’s limitations may be avoided by patients by simply not opting 
for the procedure prescribed by the Directive, since the Directive applies 
without prejudice to co-ordination regulations and does not affect pa-
tients’ entitlements stemming from co-ordination concerning unplanned 
healthcare.27 
25  See Müller-Fauré (n 3) para 90; Watts (n 3) paras 62-71; Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 
20; Pennings (n 5) 442.
26  See Commission v Spain (n 4) paras 75-76 and Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 19.
27  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 2 and Preamble to the Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) 
para 28. According to the co-ordination rules, patients are entitled to unplanned healthcare 
which becomes necessary in the state of stay, taking into consideration the nature of the 
healthcare beneﬁ ts in question and the expected length of stay, (by presenting a European 
Health Insurance Card or EHIC). This includes beneﬁ ts with the aim of ‘preventing an in-
sured person from being forced to return before the end of the planned duration of stay to 
the competent State to obtain the treatment he/she requires. The purpose of beneﬁ ts of this 
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Member State may limit the application of the rules on reimburse-
ment:
based on overriding reasons of general interest, such as planning re-
quirements relating to the aim of ensuring sufﬁ cient and permanent 
access to a balanced range of high-quality treatment in the Member 
State concerned or to the wish to control costs and avoid, as far as 
possible, any waste of ﬁ nancial, technical and human resources.28
How and when Member States may have recourse to the cited pro-
vision remains unclear. The rule in question, due to its vague wording, 
opens up a scenario whereby different Member States may apply a wide 
range of different criteria to limit the application of the reimbursement 
rules (whatever the phrase ‘limit the application’ might mean). The limi-
tation imposed by the Directive upon the Member States’ autonomy to 
apply this provision, which might be used as a starting point for the ju-
dicial control of the Member States’ transposing legislation by the Court 
of Justice, is that the rules in question ‘shall be restricted to what is nec-
essary and proportionate, and may not constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or an unjustiﬁ ed obstacle to the free movement of goods, 
persons or services’.29
In terms of payment methods and applicable tariffs, the Direc-
tive mostly codiﬁ es the case law directly applying the Treaty as far as 
planned healthcare is concerned. The patient pays the provider directly 
and is reimbursed afterwards by the state of afﬁ liation (which may also 
type is to enable the insured person to continue his/her stay under safe medical conditions, 
taking account of the planned length of the stay.’ See Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 19, 
27(1); Decision 194 of the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Work-
ers of 17 December 2003 concerning the uniform application of art 22(1)(a)(i) of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 in the Member State of stay [2003] OJ L104/127. See also 
Decision S3 of the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers of 
12 June 2009 deﬁ ning the beneﬁ ts covered by arts 19(1) and 27(1) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and art 25(A)(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2010] OJ C106/40; 
Regulation 987/2009 (n 2) art 25(3) and Case C-326/00 Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon 
(IKA) v Vasilios Ioannidis [2003] ECR I-1703, relating to Regulation 1408/71 (n 2). On being 
bound by the ﬁ ndings of the state of treatment’s doctors, see Case C-145/03 Heirs of An-
nette Keller v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS), Instituto Nacional de Gestión 
Sanitaria (Ingesa) [2005] ECR I-2529 para 53, relating to Regulation 1408/71 (n 2) and 
urgent treatments. See also Regulation 1408/71 (n 2) art 22(1)a, amended by Regulation 
(EC) 631/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amend-
ing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within 
the Community, and Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, in respect of the alignment of rights and the 
simpliﬁ cation of procedures [2004] OJ L100/1 art 1(1).
28  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(9).
29  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(11).
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pay directly). The tariffs prescribed by the legislation of the state of af-
ﬁ liation are applicable, and the reimbursement does not have to exceed 
the real price of the treatment the patient paid (unless the state of afﬁ lia-
tion voluntarily decides to pay more). This is different from co-ordination 
regulations, which prescribe that both planned and unplanned health-
care is provided on the basis of the tariffs of the state of treatment as if 
cross-border patients are socially insured there, and give an entitlement, 
originally stemming from the case law, to additional reimbursement on 
the basis of the higher competent state’s coverage in the case of planned 
healthcare.30 On the other hand, the entitlement to additional cover on 
the basis of the legislation of the state of afﬁ liation, provided for by the 
Directive for unplanned healthcare, is a gain for patients when compared 
to the case law, which does not allow for such a possibility.31 Member 
States (those that do not have them already, which may be the case for 
national health services that provide healthcare free of charge) must set 
up transparent, non-discriminatory and objective systems for calculat-
ing reimbursement.32
In terms of healthcare providers that the patients can access, the 
Directive follows the approach by the Court of Justice applying free-move-
ment Treaty provisions. Thus, according to the Patient Mobility Directive, 
patients can access any provider who lawfully provides healthcare in the 
state of treatment. This is different when compared to the co-ordination 
regulations, according to which patients only access those providers who 
are attached (employed or contracted by) to the state of treatment’s social 
security system.33
Travel and costs of accommodation may be reimbursed by the state 
of afﬁ liation, but the Directive’s normative part does not lay down an 
explicit duty for that state to do so, even when it covers the costs in ques-
tion on its own territory (this duty is contained in the free-movement 
case law and has been taken over by co-ordination regulations). In this 
way, the legislator refrained from expressly reafﬁ rming the case law on 
30  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(4). See also Watts (n 3) para 131; Regulation 
883/2004 (n 2) arts 19-20, 27 and Regulation 987/2009 (n 2) arts 25-26(7). According 
to these co-ordination rules, patients only have to pay upfront if the state of treatment’s 
patients are required to do so. In the case of unplanned healthcare, reimbursement on the 
basis of the competent state’s tariffs is possible if the patient has agreed to this (and without 
agreement in the case that the state of treatment’s legislation does not provide for reim-
bursement), and when the patient has had to pay all or part of the treatment costs. 
31  See Commission v Spain (n 4) paras 45-81.
32  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(6). See also Watts (n 3) paras 74 and 133.
33  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) arts 3 and 7. See also Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) arts 
19-20 and 27.
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the issue.34 However, taking into account the Directive’s Preamble (para-
graph 34), which states that Member States are free to cover travel and 
accommodation costs for foreign treatments even when they do not cover 
them for domestic treatments, and the fact that free movement (which 
prohibits discrimination against foreign service providers) is the basis 
for the Directive, it can be concluded that Member States must cover 
travel and accommodation costs for foreign treatments when they cover 
them for domestic treatments. 
The Directive also prescribes the requirements that authorisation 
and reimbursement procedures must satisfy. These do not provide con-
crete gains for the patients. What is especially important is that the 
legislator did not use the possibility of imposing explicit deadlines on 
the state of afﬁ liation to reach decisions on the coverage of cross-border 
healthcare.35
Therefore, the Directive’s rules on reimbursement deal with the is-
sues raised by the case law but, as described in the previous paragraphs, 
do not completely codify the case law but contain notable differences 
when compared to it.
2.2 New developments
Apart from the reimbursement rules, the Directive contains a set 
of rules which do not directly correspond to the rules emphasised by 
the case law on patient mobility, although traces of some of them can 
be found in other pieces of case law (for instance, the prohibition of dis-
crimination in terms of applicable tariffs in the state of treatment, which 
is visible in Ferlini).36
Firstly, the Patient Mobility Directive contains rules on the recogni-
tion of medical prescriptions by Member States. If there is authorisation 
for a medicinal product to be marketed on their territory, Member States 
must make it possible for prescriptions issued for that item in a different 
Member State to be dispensed on their territory according to their legis-
lation. No restrictions concerning the recognition of individual prescrip-
tions are allowed, except in enumerated cases. The rules on prescription 
recognition do not affect the Directive’s reimbursement rules.37
34  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(4). See also Watts (n 3) paras 139-140 and Regula-
tion 987/2009 (n 2) art 26(8).
35  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 9.
36  Case C-411/98 Angelo Ferlini v Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg [2000] ECR I-8081.
37  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 11(1). 
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Secondly, the Patient Mobility Directive establishes a set of duties 
imposed upon the state of treatment. The state of treatment is not allowed 
to discriminate between domestic and foreign patients.38 However, it may 
limit access to healthcare on its territory on the basis of overriding rea-
sons of general interest, to prevent an increase on domestic waiting lists 
because of an inﬂ ow of foreign patients. The measures in question must 
be necessary, proportionate, must not constitute arbitrary discrimina-
tion and must be publicised in advance.39 In terms of tariffs:
Member States shall ensure that the healthcare providers on their 
territory apply the same scale of fees for healthcare for patients from 
other Member States, as for domestic patients in a comparable med-
ical situation, or that they charge a price calculated according to 
objective, non-discriminatory criteria if there is no comparable price 
for domestic patients. This paragraph shall be without prejudice to 
national legislation which allows healthcare providers to set their 
own prices, provided that they do not discriminate against patients 
from other Member States.40
It can be argued that this provision enables Member States to calcu-
late tariffs for incoming foreign patients by using different formulas than 
for domestic patients, which may be to the detriment of foreign patients 
in some situations, but also to their advantage in others. In any case, the 
Patient Mobility Directive still leaves possibilities for the state of treat-
ment to limit the access of foreign patients to its healthcare providers.
Thirdly, a signiﬁ cant new development concerns the right to infor-
mation. According to the Patient Mobility Directive, both the state of af-
ﬁ liation and the state of treatment must establish contact points which 
will, upon request, provide patients with the relevant data on cross-bor-
der healthcare.41
In the Member State of treatment, the data includes:
information concerning healthcare providers, including, on request, 
information on a speciﬁ c provider’s right to provide services or any 
restrictions on its practice, information referred to in Article 4(2)(a), 
as well as information on patients’ rights, complaints procedures 
and mechanisms for seeking remedies, according to the legislation 
of that Member State, as well as the legal and administrative options 
38  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 4(3). 
39  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 4(3) and Preamble to the Patient Mobility Directive (n 
1) para 21.
40  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 4(4). See also Ferlini (n 36).
41  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 6. 
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available to settle disputes, including in the event of harm arising 
from cross-border healthcare.42
Article 4(2)(a) deals with information concerning standards of quality 
and safety. In this regard, it must be stressed that the principles of uni-
versality, good quality care, equity and solidarity have found their place 
within the framework of the Directive. Furthermore, the state of treatment 
is to provide for professional liability insurance (or similar) and remedies 
for patients who suffer harm as a result of any healthcare obtained.43
The Member State of afﬁ liation must provide the patient, upon re-
quest, with all the information concerning reimbursement conditions 
and procedures for the coverage of healthcare abroad. 44
Fourthly, in addition to the right to information enabling patient 
choice, the Patient Mobility Directive contains important provisions on 
co-operation and mutual assistance between national authorities, in-
cluding co-operation on standards and guidelines on quality and safety 
(some of the provisions are based on the EU supporting and facilitating 
co-operation among Member States).45 Furthermore, it explicitly men-
tions European reference networks, based on the voluntary participation 
of European healthcare providers and centres of expertise, and deﬁ nes 
their objectives, inter alia: 
a) to help realise the potential of European cooperation regarding 
highly specialised healthcare for patients and for healthcare systems 
by exploiting innovations in medical science and health technologies;
...
(d) to maximise the cost-effective use of resources by concentrating 
them where appropriate;
... 
(h) to help Member States with an insufﬁ cient number of patients 
with a particular medical condition or lacking technology or exper-
tise to provide highly specialised services of high quality.46
42  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 6(3). 
43  See Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 4.
44  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) arts 6(4), 5(b). 
45  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 10. See also Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 15, 
concerning health technology assessment, as a form of Open Method of Co-ordination. On 
this part of the Patient Mobility Directive, see T Hervey, ‘Cooperation between Health Care 
Authorities in the Proposed Directive on Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare’ in van 
de Gronden, Szyszczak, Neergaard and Krajewski (n 5).
46  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 12. See also Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 14 
concerning e-health.
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The Commission has a role in determining a list of criteria and con-
ditions the networks and providers must fulﬁ l.47 
It must be added that the Directive provides for the European Com-
mission to support Member States in co-operating in the development 
of diagnosis and treatment capacity concerning rare diseases. This is 
especially to be achieved by making patients, healthcare providers and 
national social security healthcare institutions aware of the possibili-
ties offered by the co-ordination rules for the referral of patients with 
rare diseases to other Member States, even for treatments which are not 
available in the state of afﬁ liation.48
As we can see, the described provisions aim at tackling structural 
problems in providing healthcare at the national level. These problems 
particularly affect Member States in which the numbers of patients suf-
fering from certain medical conditions do not justify the maintenance 
of resources to treat these conditions and those Member States which, 
due to economic considerations, are unable to invest resources in health 
care at a level that is comparable to certain other Member States. One 
example of a smaller Member State which already enables its patients to 
travel abroad to obtain healthcare treatments for which there are no na-
tional resources is Ireland. The second example of this kind of country is 
Croatia, which will be analysed in the following section. In addition, even 
the UK currently does not have the capacity to offer certain advanced 
healthcare treatments (this is the case with proton therapy), and refers 
(and funds) patients abroad to obtain such treatments.49
3 Discussion
3.1 One step forward
In terms of reimbursement social security rules, the Patient Mobil-
ity Directive adds certain patient entitlements in obtaining socially cov-
ered healthcare outside the state of social protection when compared to 
the preceding legal framework (co-ordination regulations and the case 
law directly applying the Treaty’s free movement rules). The Directive 
also improves (for patients) the overall framework for obtaining cross-
border healthcare in certain areas, like the recognition of prescriptions, 
47  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 12(4).
48  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 13. 
49  See National Specialised Commissioning Team, ‘Guidance for the Referral of Patients 
Abroad for NHS Proton Treatment’ (2011); Health Service Executive, ‘Health Service Execu-
tive Treatment Abroad Scheme: E112 (IE) Application Form’ (2012); and Ordinance on Enti-
tlements, Conditions, and Way of Exercising Health Care Abroad (Ofﬁ cial Gazette 50/09 to 
76/12) (Pravilnik o pravima, uvjetima i naËinu korištenja zdravstvene zaštite u inozemstvu 
NN 50/09 do 76/12) (hereinafter Healthcare Abroad Ordinance 2009) art 21.
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the state of treatment’s duties, the right to information, co-operation and 
reference networks.
a) In the area of unplanned healthcare, the Directive offers the pos-
sibility of obtaining healthcare under more favourable domestic rules 
and tariffs. Since there is no such possibility under the case law, it has 
already been observed that this is a rare case of Member States being 
willing to enhance possibilities and rights stemming from free movement 
when the Court is unwilling to do the same.50 Here, the legal nature of 
the Directive is important. In the case that the Directive is a ‘ﬁ eld oc-
cupying’ Directive, one that provides for total harmonisation of a certain 
area, Member States are not permitted to use Treaty-based grounds for 
imposing restrictions. If the Directive is a ‘minimum harmonisation’ Di-
rective, such grounds are available to the states.51 Since the Directive 
states that it respects national competences in organising healthcare, 
and taking into account the legal basis (TFE article 168) which sup-
ports the same conclusion, it seems that Member States may still use the 
Treaty to restrict reimbursement for unplanned healthcare.52
b) Provisions concerning prescriptions make it possible for patients 
to avail themselves of prescriptions issued for a medicinal product in 
another Member State. 
c) Provisions concerning the duties of the state of treatment are 
a gain for patients when compared to the case law, which mostly lacks 
clear statements on these issues. Besides the prohibition of price dis-
crimination, which is already present in the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice, rules whereby the state of treatment must provide information 
on providers and patients’ rights (transparency), the rules on complaints 
procedures, mechanisms for seeking remedies, professional liability in-
surance (accountability), and also on contact points are a signiﬁ cant 
gain for patients accessing healthcare in a state other than the state of 
social protection. Furthermore, since it is hard to imagine these rules 
and principles applying only to patients from other Member States, their 
universal applicability (to all patients) seems logical.53
50  See Van der Mei (n 5) 439.
51  On these notions, see TK Hervey, ‘If Only It Were So Simple - Public Health Services and 
EU Law’, in M Cremona (ed), Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union 
(OUP 2011). See also Case C-205/07 Criminal proceedings against Gysbrechts and Santurel 
Inter BVBA [2008] ECR I-9947 para 33.
52  See Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 1.
53  Some have seen the Directive as a step forward in harmonising certain aspects of Member 
States’ healthcare systems. See W Sauter, ‘Harmonisation in Healthcare: The EU Patients’ 
Rights Directive’ (TILEC Discussion Paper 06, 2011) <http://www.nza.nl/104107/230942/
Research_paper_’Harmonisation_in_healthcare_the_EU_patients’_rights_directive’.pdf> ac-
cessed 25 January 2012. On this topic, see also G Davies, ‘Legislating for Patients’ Rights’, 
in van de Gronden, Szyszczak, Neergaard and Krajewski (n 5) 205-207.
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d) Provisions concerning the right to information in the state of afﬁ li-
ation, including national contact points, are another gain for patients.
e) Provisions on co-operation and European reference networks open 
up possibilities for patients to proﬁ t from the Directive, which tackles 
the structural imbalances in healthcare provision at the national level. 
These problems can be relieved, for example, by cross-border contract-
ing of healthcare, whereby social security institutions from one Mem-
ber State enter into contracts with healthcare providers from another. 
These can, for instance, be situations where foreign providers specialise 
in certain treatments for which there are no capacities in the state of af-
ﬁ liation (like the case of the UK and proton therapy). Another example 
of cross-border contracting is when national institutions contract foreign 
providers to shorten waiting times for domestic providers with limited 
capacities.54 Public debate at the Union level has helped to bring these 
possibilities to the notice of national social security institutions.55 
The European Union’s role in steering processes involving sever-
al Member States, and setting them within a coherent European-wide 
framework, can be envisaged. In practical terms, the EU is best placed, 
with its capabilities to obtain enough information on different national 
systems and co-ordinate them, to be the driving force behind the new de-
velopments. In legal terms, the EU primarily has competence in health-
care, as demonstrated by TFEU articles 6 and 168, to support and com-
plement Member States’ actions, which is precisely the case here. The 
Guidelines on Block Purchasing of 2005 represent one of the steps in 
this direction, and the Patient Mobility Directive follows suit. Since, due 
to the fact that Member States retain the autonomy to deﬁ ne and organ-
ise their social security systems, the harmonisation of social healthcare 
entitlements (whereby every socially covered person within the EU would 
have an entitlement to the same healthcare treatments under the same 
conditions) seems impossible, complementing Member States’ healthcare 
actions is something to which the EU will probably have to limit itself in 
the years to come.56 
54  One example of the latter situation is the Irish National Treatment Purchase Fund, 
which used to contract healthcare providers from the UK. See to this effect National Treat-
ment Purchase Fund, ‘Annual Report 2009’ (2009) 1; National Treatment Purchase Fund, 
‘Patient Booklet’ (2004) 8; National Treatment Purchase Fund, ‘Freedom of Information 
Guidance Manual’ (2006) 17.
55  See M Wismar, W Palm, J Figueras, K Ernst and E van Ginneken (eds), Cross-border 
Health Care in the European Union - Mapping and Analysing Practices and Policies (WHO 
2011) and A Obermaier, The End of Territoriality? The Impact of ECJ Rulings on British Ger-
man and French Social Policy (Ashgate 2009). 
56  See Commission of the European Communities, ‘Guidelines for Purchase of Treatment 
Abroad’ (2005) and the analysis by TK Hervey, ‘New Governance Responses to Healthcare 
Migration in the EU: The EU Guidelines on Block Purchasing’ (2007) 14 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law 303.
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f) The mere fact that codiﬁ cation exists in addition to casuistic ju-
risprudence makes it harder for a Member State to claim that individual 
judgments by the Court are not applicable to it because of some unique 
characteristic of its system.57 
Therefore, in certain aspects, the Directive facilitates patient mobil-
ity within the EU when compared to the co-ordination rules and case law 
directly applying the Treaty.
3.2 One step back
There are certain areas in which the Patient Mobility Directive may 
prove to be counterproductive when compared to the co-ordination regu-
lations and case law, in the sense that it reduces the entitlements of 
patients to obtain socially covered healthcare outside the state of social 
protection.
a) The ﬁ rst area in which the Directive offers less than the preced-
ing framework to patients concerns the range of healthcare covered. The 
Member States are given more leeway to deﬁ ne (restrict) the range of 
healthcare treatments they cover, when compared to the co-ordination 
rules and case law. It seems that the Directive allows Member States to 
limit the range of treatments covered not only at the level of national leg-
islation, but also at the level of local healthcare purchasers.58 This pos-
sibility for Member States to limit their coverage is deﬁ nitely a setback 
for patients’ rights to access cross-border healthcare, and reﬂ ects the 
wish of Member States to protect their social policy choices (such as local 
commissioning of healthcare) via EU secondary legislation.59
b) Member States have a wider set of options of imposing prior au-
thorisation under the Directive than under the case law applying the 
Treaty. Seemingly, the only improvement in the individual patient’s posi-
tion when compared to the case law is that according to the Directive, a 
treatment which is a hospital treatment, but which does not involve over-
night accommodation, does not warrant prior authorisation. However, 
according to the case law, ‘services provided in a hospital environment 
but that could also be provided by a practitioner in his surgery or in a 
health centre could, for that reason, be placed on the same footing as 
57  See, as a particularly good example, Watts (n 3).
58  See Elchinov (n 3) paras 67-73.
59  There is an argument that national social policy cannot be equated with national con-
stitutional identity, since policy is a variable of national government. This implies stricter 
scrutiny by the Court of Justice over policy choices than over Member States’ fundamental 
constitutional choices. See to this effect S Rodin, ‘National Identity and Market Freedoms 
after The Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2005691> accessed 10 January 2012.
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non-hospital services.’60 Therefore, the possibility of patients accessing 
hospital out-patient treatment without prior authorisation existed even 
before the Directive was adopted.
What is especially striking is that there is no explicit entitlement to 
access healthcare without waiting for prior authorisation in cases of ur-
gency, while such entitlement exists under the Treaty and co-ordination 
rules (as interpreted by the Court of Justice). There is only a statement 
in the Preamble (paragraph 47) that the patient should receive decisions 
regarding cross-border healthcare within a reasonable amount of time, 
and that the time can be shortened due to urgency, and a provision that 
when deciding on requests for cross-border healthcare, urgency must 
be taken into account. These provisions can be interpreted in various 
ways.61  
In addition, different Member States can have different deﬁ nitions 
of cost-intensive medical infrastructure (in cases of which they can im-
pose prior authorisation), depending on their national contexts. It can be 
argued that the lists of treatments warranting prior authorisation will 
be longer in Member States with comparatively fewer resources available 
for allocation to healthcare than in Member States with more resources 
at their disposal. In this way, patients from certain Member States could 
ﬁ nd themselves in a much worse position than patients from other Mem-
ber States.
Thus, the provisions of the Directive can be seen as signiﬁ cantly 
limiting patients’ entitlements to obtain healthcare without prior au-
thorisation.
c) The co-ordination rules and case law provide for a smaller num-
ber of grounds on which authorisation may be refused than the Patient 
Mobility Directive. Additional grounds for refusal concern public health 
hazards, patient-safety risks and provider-related concerns. Member 
States can also limit the application of reimbursement rules based on 
overriding reasons of general interest, which leaves possibilities for vari-
ous scenarios and interpretations by different Member States.
Taking all this together, it can be assumed that the Patient Mobil-
ity Directive will be mostly relevant as a legal instrument for access-
ing healthcare which does not require prior authorisation, depending 
on how the Court of Justice will interpret obvious differences between 
the Directive and its case law applying the Treaty on when authorisation 
may be imposed (namely, whether the additional grounds for imposing 
60  See Commission v France C-512/08 (n 3) para 35. See also Pennings (n 5) 440-441.
61  See Elchinov (n 3) paras 43-51. See also Commission v France C-512/08 (n 3) para 27 
and Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 9.
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authorisation will be interpreted as falling within the accepted justiﬁ ca-
tions for limiting free movement). In cases in which prior authorisation 
is required, using co-ordination regulations provides the patients with 
an opportunity to obtain healthcare on the basis of the tariffs set by the 
state of treatment, while maintaining the entitlement to higher cover-
age by the competent state. Furthermore, it must be stressed that the 
Patient Mobility Directive, unlike the co-ordination rules, provides for di-
rect payment upfront by the patient to the provider, a fact which favours 
well-off patients, and makes co-ordination more appealing to patients 
from less afﬂ uent Member States.62
The issue of substantial differences between the Directive and judg-
ments applying primary law remains ambiguous, especially in those ar-
eas in which the Directive gives more leeway to the states than the case 
law does. If we remember that, apart from the case law applying the 
Treaty and Directive, there are also EU co-ordination rules which regu-
late the same area, it is not hard to conclude that the clarity of patients’ 
cross-border entitlements and legal certainty suffer from the existing 
complex EU legal framework. When it comes to rules on reimbursement 
and social cover, there are now in effect three parallel legal instruments 
which apply to the same area: co-ordination regulations, Treaty free-
movement provisions and the Patient Mobility Directive. 
A logical question arises: was it possible to incorporate the changes 
brought about by the case law into the co-ordination regulations? Some of 
them actually have been incorporated (the right to additional reimburse-
ment in accordance with the competent state’s rules and also travel and 
accommodation costs in planned healthcare) into the co-ordination in-
struments. On the other hand, it is much easier to adopt a directive on the 
basis of TFEU article 114 than to amend the co-ordination rules, where 
unanimity essentially still applies through TFEU article 48 and the ‘emer-
gency brake’ procedure. In terms of substance, however, spelling out all 
the rules on the social security cover of cross-border healthcare in a single 
legal instrument would have beneﬁ ted patients due to the increased clar-
ity and transparency of the framework. In any case, the Court should use 
its future jurisprudence to clarify outstanding issues.63
Thus, the Patient Mobility Directive’s impact on the actual move-
ment of patients across borders might prove to be counterproductive in 
some areas, due to limitations upon some of their entitlements to access 
62  See Regulation 883/2004 (n 2) art 20 and Regulation 987/2009 (n 2) art 26(7).
63  See Regulation 987/2009 (n 2) art 26(7-8). See also E Szyszczak, ‘Patients’ Rights: A Lost 
Cause or Missed Opportunity?’ in van de Gronden, Szyszczak, Neergaard and Krajewski (n 
5) 125. On the emergency brake, see Commission of the European Communities, ‘Treaty of 
Lisbon: New Cases of Qualiﬁ ed Majority Voting’ (Council and European Council) (2007).
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socially covered healthcare. On the other hand, the Directive will also 
add to some patients’ entitlements and opportunities to access health-
care abroad. Therefore, the Directive’s impact in facilitating patients to 
obtain socially covered healthcare outside their state of social protection 
remains ambivalent.
3.3 Case study: Croatia
3.3.1 Overview
Croatia is an interesting example to illustrate the problems con-
cerning the transposition and implementation of the Patient Mobility Di-
rective. This is due to the fact that Croatia is to become a Member State 
a few months before the end of the transposition period, but especially 
because it can be used as an example of how a country which is still 
not an EU Member State regulates patient entitlements to obtain so-
cially covered healthcare abroad without the EU rules. In addition, it is a 
relatively small country in terms of territory and population, with a per 
capita GDP signiﬁ cantly lower than the EU average, a fact that makes it 
vulnerable to problems in maintaining expensive human and material 
capacities to treat certain medical conditions, which is one of the prob-
lems the Directive deals with.64 Since the Patient Mobility Directive reim-
bursement rules deal with the obligations of the state of afﬁ liation (the 
competent state) to cover the healthcare of its patients obtained abroad, 
the focus is placed on the Croatian rules covering patients socially in-
sured in Croatia obtaining healthcare outside the country.
The system of social coverage of healthcare obtained abroad is cur-
rently regulated in Croatia through several legal instruments. The ﬁ rst 
ones are bilateral agreements on social security co-ordination concluded 
between Croatia and individual EU Member States. Bilateral agreements 
take precedence over national statutes once ratiﬁ ed.65 Croatia has con-
cluded bilateral agreements, including those assumed from the former 
Yugoslavia, with 17 Member States of the European Union. These are: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.66 These agreements 
are mutual, meaning that provisions which are applicable to Croatian 
(socially covered) patients accessing healthcare abroad are generally also 
64  According to EUROSTAT <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&i
nit=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114> accessed on 12 September 2012.
65  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ofﬁ cial Gazette 56/90 to 85/10) (Ustav Repub-
like Hrvatske NN, 56/90 do 85/10) (hereinafter Croatian Constitution 1990) arts 140-141.
66  See M Rismondo, Zbirka ugovora o socijalnom osiguranju (Narodne novine 2007).
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applicable to foreign (socially covered) patients accessing healthcare in 
Croatia. 
The agreements can be divided into those which cover only the na-
tionals of countries which are parties to the agreements in question, their 
family members and, in some cases, refugees and stateless persons, and 
those which cover all persons socially insured by those countries, and 
their family members. The main criterion for determining the competent 
state is the law of the place of work or lex loci laboris.67
The legal source that generally regulates the social security coverage 
of healthcare in Croatia is the Compulsory Health Insurance Act of 2008 
(hereinafter the Health Insurance Act of 2008). This act determines the 
personal scope of the application of the Croatian social security health-
care system, the range of covered healthcare in general, and the cover of 
health treatments obtained outside Croatia.68 
Every resident of Croatia (but also foreigners granted permanent 
stay, except in cases in which international agreements determine oth-
erwise; an exception also exists concerning children under 18 years of 
age, who are considered to be insured) is obliged to obtain social insur-
ance with the Health Insurance Institute of Croatia (HIIC) on one of the 
grounds enumerated by the Health Insurance Act of 2008. These grounds 
include conducting a professional activity, putting Croatia somewhere in 
between the professional and occupational systems of social security. 
Healthcare is covered mainly through direct payments by the HIIC to 
providers, making the system a beneﬁ ts-in-kind system. The range of 
covered healthcare is prescribed using broad notions and various crite-
ria, which include types of medical condition (illnesses), types of patient 
(for instance, free-of-charge provision for persons who have not turned 
18) and types of medical procedure (health treatments).69
Finally, a statutory instrument regulating healthcare abroad has 
been adopted by the HIIC (following the consent of the minister in charge 
of healthcare). The instrument must be applied in line with the relevant 
statutes and international agreements. These provisions deal with op-
67  The ﬁ rst group consists of agreements with Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The second group consists of agree-
ments with Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Romania and Slovenia. See Rismondo (n 66) 14.
68  Compulsory Health Insurance Act (Ofﬁ cial Gazette 150/08 to 90/12) (Zakon o obveznom 
zdravstvenom osiguranju NN 150/08 do 90/12) (hereinafter Health Insurance Act 2008).
69  See Health Insurance Act 2008 (n 68) arts 3-16. See also D Pieters, Social Security: An 
Introduction to the Basic Principles (2nd edn Kluwer Law International 2006) 21-22. On the 
deﬁ nition of residence, see Residence and Stay of Citizens Act (Ofﬁ cial Gazette 53/91 to 
11/00) (Zakon o prebivalištu i boravištu graana NN 53/91 do 11/00) arts 2-4.
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portunities for Croatian (socially covered) patients to access healthcare 
outside Croatia and for it to be paid for by the HIIC.70
3.3.2 Problems with the Patient Mobility Directive
The ﬁ rst area in which the transposition of the Patient Mobility 
Directive in Croatia may run into problems concerns determining the 
range of healthcare covered, namely when accessing planned healthcare 
abroad. As noted, the range of healthcare covered is prescribed using 
broad notions and various criteria which include the types of medical 
condition, categories of patient and types of medical procedure. This 
technique opens up possibilities for Croatian patients to access the best 
possible healthcare anywhere in the EU (once Croatia accedes to the 
latter) which ﬁ t into these broad notions. The Patient Mobility Directive 
recognises the autonomy of Member States in determining by themselves 
the general national basket of covered healthcare, including the right to 
do so not only via national statutes or statutory instruments but also at 
the regional or local level. However, Croatia does not deﬁ ne the range of 
covered healthcare locally, but instead leaves it to the medical profession 
to deﬁ ne which medical treatments are recognised by medical science 
and are thus covered by the broad national deﬁ nitions of the healthcare 
covered. The coverage of treatments which are recognised by medical sci-
ence but not provided in Croatia is currently possible, but it remains am-
biguous whether certain healthcare treatments which are recognised by 
the medical profession abroad, but which have never been tested or used 
in Croatia, are to be considered (according to the Directive) as being cov-
ered by Croatian national legislation and thus eligible to be funded when 
provided abroad. This is especially questionable in cases where there is 
no consensus within ‘international medical science’ regarding a certain 
treatment.71 Therefore, it is dubious how Croatia will interpret its obli-
gations concerning the range of healthcare abroad it will have to cover 
under the Patient Mobility Directive, a lack of clarity which does not help 
Croatian patients obtain socially covered healthcare outside Croatia.
The second important aspect of the Patient Mobility Directive which 
raises ambiguities in the Croatian case concerns the possibility of impos-
ing prior authorisation for Croatian patients accessing planned health-
care abroad. Only a small number of Croatian bilateral agreements con-
tain provisions concerning planned healthcare. In these cases, coverage 
70  Health Insurance Act 2008 (n 68) art 20 and Health Care Abroad Ordinance 2009 (n 
49).
71  On this issue, see Us-2107/2008 Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia 12 
January 2011 and Us-4587/2009 Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia 20 Janu-
ary 2011.
168 Tomislav Sokol, Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, Ana AbramoviÊ: Patient Mobility Directive...
is generally provided by the competent state on the basis of the state of 
treatment’s rules and tariffs (settled between the two states), and pa-
tients can only access providers attached to the social security of the 
latter state. Prior authorisation is required, but can be granted after-
wards if it was not requested in time for objective reasons in the cases of 
Germany, Hungary and Slovenia.72
Generally, prior authorisation for planned healthcare can be given 
for healthcare abroad for treating congenital defects, for carrying out or-
gan transplants, and for treating malignant diseases. Authorisation can 
be given if treatments which are necessary cannot be provided by HIIC-
afﬁ liated healthcare providers in Croatia but can be provided abroad. 
Exceptionally, authorisation may be granted for treatments abroad not 
related to the mentioned diseases. Treatments can also be provided by 
providers not afﬁ liated to the state of treatment’s social security system 
(these will not be covered under bilateral agreements).73
As noted in the section on the Patient Mobility Directive, the Direc-
tive prescribes several possibilities for Member States to impose prior 
authorisation. The main problem concerns treatments which are:
made subject to planning requirements relating to the object of en-
suring sufﬁ cient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-
quality treatment in the Member State concerned or to the wish to 
control costs and avoid, as far as possible, any waste of ﬁ nancial, 
technical and human resources and ... require use of ‘highly spe-
cialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equip-
ment’.74 
The reason for claiming there is a problem is the fact that coun-
tries’ methods of controlling costs depend on the speciﬁ c national con-
text, which implies that Croatia can have a different (wider) deﬁ nition 
of problematic ‘cost-intensive medical infrastructure’ than, for instance, 
Germany, which has signiﬁ cantly more ﬁ nancial resources available to 
allocate for healthcare. The latter situation is clearly visible from the fact 
72  These include agreements with Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Slovenia. See, for example, Agreement on Social Insurance between the Republic of Croatia 
and Republic of Austria (Ofﬁ cial Gazette - International Agreements 15/97 and 13/98) 
(Ugovor o socijalnom osiguranju izmeu Republike Hrvatske i Republike Austrije NN-MU, 
15/97 i 13/98) (hereinafter Croatia-Austria Agreement 1997) art 11 and Agreement on 
Social Insurance between the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Slovenia (Ofﬁ cial Gazette 
- International Agreements 16/97 and 3/98) (Sporazum o socijalnom osiguranju izmeu 
Republike Hrvatske i Republike Slovenije NN-MU, 16/97 i 3/98) (hereinafter Croatia-Slov-
enia Agreement 1998) art 12.
73  Healthcare Abroad Ordinance 2009 (n 49) art 21. See also the Health Insurance Act 
2008 (n 68) art 20.
74  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 8(2).
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that annually most Croatian patients sent abroad are sent to Germany 
and Austria to obtain advanced healthcare treatments not available at 
home.75 Thus, the Patient Mobility Directive can be seen as allowing, and 
even exacerbating, differences between patients from various Member 
States in terms of accessing healthcare abroad, and putting Croatian 
patients in a comparatively worse situation when compared to patients 
from certain EU Member States.
The third important ambiguity of the Patient Mobility Directive that 
can cause problems within the Croatian context concerns the possi-
bilities of limiting the application of reimbursement rules. As Member 
States can limit the application of reimbursement rules based on over-
riding reasons of general interest,76 various Member States can interpret 
the notion of ‘overriding reasons of general interest’ in different ways. 
Since the Croatian context in terms of resource allocation is signiﬁ cantly 
different when compared to several Member States, as noted in the pre-
vious paragraphs, its interpretation of the notion of ‘overriding reasons 
of general interest’ can also vary when compared to these other states, 
thus limiting the opportunities of Croatian patients to access healthcare 
abroad.
Finally, it must be emphasised that the Patient Mobility Directive 
favours well-off patients who are able to pay the healthcare provider up-
front, and request reimbursement afterwards. Within the Croatian con-
text, it can be assumed that Croatian patients of average means will not 
ﬁ nd it easy to obtain most advanced healthcare treatments in Germany 
or Austria, the countries where Croatian patients obtain most (expensive) 
planned healthcare treatments which are not available in Croatia.77
3.3.3 Amending the national rules to conform with the Patient Mobility 
Directive
There are certain national rules within the Croatian framework 
which will have to be changed once Croatia joins the EU and the Direc-
tive’s transposition period expires. 
The ﬁ rst thing that will have to be abolished is the special contri-
bution for unplanned healthcare. Currently, the only possibility of ac-
cessing unplanned healthcare for Croatian patients outside Croatia that 
is covered by the HIIC exists if a special contribution has been paid by 
the patient, his/her employer or a third person in some cases. The pa-
75  Health Insurance Institute of Croatia, ‘IzvješÊe o upuÊivanju osiguranih osoba na li-
jeËenje u inozemstvo tijekom 2010. godine’ (2011). 
76  Patient Mobility Directive (n 1) art 7(9).
77  See Health Insurance Institute of Croatia (n 75).
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tient must obtain an HIIC certiﬁ cate before travelling abroad, otherwise 
there will be no coverage (an exception concerns business trips). The per-
son who had to apply for the certiﬁ cate pays the costs.78 This provision, 
which makes Croatian patients pay a special contribution in order to 
access socially covered healthcare abroad, can be regarded as discrimi-
nation against foreign healthcare providers when compared to domestic 
(Croatian) ones, and will have to be abolished.
Secondly, the current Croatian legal framework provisions that pro-
vide mostly for the coverage of emergency unplanned healthcare obtained 
abroad (a narrower notion than ‘necessary healthcare’ under EU co-or-
dination rules) for Croatian patients will have to be abolished. According 
to the statutory instrument currently in force, Croatian insured persons 
privately staying abroad and students and pupils studying abroad on 
their own account have an entitlement to emergency healthcare (also 
family members of persons sent abroad for work or education). The latter 
care includes diagnostic and therapeutic procedures necessary to elimi-
nate a direct peril to the person’s life and health. Other persons are enti-
tled to healthcare that cannot be postponed until the patient’s return to 
Croatian care (including family members of persons sent abroad for edu-
cation or work). Some of the bilateral agreements do not contain speciﬁ c 
provisions on coverage of unplanned healthcare abroad at all,79 while 
other agreements provide for coverage of emergency (urgent) healthcare 
to prevent danger to one’s life and health.80 Under the Directive, Croatia 
will have to provide for coverage of wider healthcare than is currently the 
case, and amend national rules accordingly. 
78  See Health Care Abroad Ordinance 2009 (n 49) arts 5-14. See also the Contributions 
Act (Ofﬁ cial Gazette 84/08 to 22/12) (Zakon o doprinosima NN 84/08 do 22/12). According 
to certain bilateral agreements, the state of treatment can request a certiﬁ cate afterwards. 
See, for example, the Administrative Agreement on the Implementation of the Agreement 
on Social Insurance between the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Slovenia (Ofﬁ cial Ga-
zette - International Agreements 5/98) (Administrativni sporazum o provedbi Sporazuma 
o socijalnom osiguranju izmeu Republike Hrvatske i Republike Slovenije NN-MU, 5/98) 
(hereinafter Croatia-Slovenia Administrative Agreement 1998) art 6.
79  These include agreements with Bulgaria, Denmark, France and Sweden. There are cer-
tain special rules on posted workers. See, for example, Agreement on Social Insurance 
between the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bulgaria (Ofﬁ cial Gazette - International 
Agreements 4/04 and 7/04) (Ugovor izmeu Republike Hrvatske i Republike Bugarske o 
socijalnom osiguranju NN-MU, 4/04 i 7/04) (hereinafter Croatia-Bulgaria Agreement 2004) 
art 8.
80  These include agreements with Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. See, 
for example, Agreement on Social Insurance between the Republic of Croatia and Republic 
of Hungary (Ofﬁ cial Gazette - International Agreements 11/05 and 3/06) (Ugovor o socijal-
nom osiguranju izmeu Republike Hrvatske i Republike Maarske NN-MU, 11/05 i 3/06) 
(hereinafter Croatia-Hungary Agreement 2006) art 11.
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Third, in terms of planned healthcare, the main disparity between 
the Croatian legal framework and the Patient Mobility Directive is the 
fact that, under Croatia’s legal framework, prior authorisation is al-
most always required for Croatian (socially covered patients) to access 
healthcare outside its territory.81 The only exception is under certain 
bilateral agreements according to which the authorisation can be given 
afterwards if it has not been requested in time for objective reasons. 
Under the Patient Mobility Directive, there is a relatively wider range 
of possibilities to access healthcare abroad without prior authorisation 
(although with some ambiguities, described in the previous paragraphs), 
and Croatia will have to prescribe these possibilities and, thus, change 
the national rules on authorisation. It must also be added that according 
to the bilateral agreements, only providers attached to the social secu-
rity of the state of treatment can be accessed on the basis of the latter 
state’s tariffs. When the agreements are abolished, the Directive will also 
entitle Croatian patients to obtain healthcare according to Croatian tar-
iffs from those healthcare providers who are not attached to the state of 
treatment’s social security.
Croatia will also have to implement the Directive’s provisions on 
the right to information, mutual co-operation and reference networks. 
Here, it is especially important to emphasise that Croatian patients are 
to a large extent already sent abroad if treatments which are necessary 
cannot be provided by HIIC-afﬁ liated healthcare providers in Croatia but 
can be provided by foreign providers, which includes treatments which 
are recognised by medical science but which are not provided in Croatia. 
These are treatments for which it is not feasible to maintain national 
(including human) resources for various reasons.82 This situation is a 
strong incentive for Croatian healthcare providers to take part in the 
European reference networks, which are designed to help Member States 
with an insufﬁ cient number of patients with a particular medical condi-
tion or which are lacking in technology or expertise to provide high-qual-
ity specialised services. It is possible that if the networks really take off, 
certain Croatian hospitals will become centres of expertise for certain 
medical conditions (at least for neighbouring countries), while on the 
other hand Croatia will develop further routes for referring patients with 
other medical conditions abroad.
Finally, Croatia will have to implement the parts of the Directive 
which concern the duties of the state of treatment for patients coming 
from other Member States to obtain healthcare in Croatia. This is espe-
81  Health Care Abroad Ordinance 2009 (n 49) art 21.
82  See, for instance, Us-8248/2005 Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia 17 
April 2008.
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cially the case with the Directive’s rules on prohibiting price discrimi-
nation (currently, for patients who come from countries with which no 
bilateral agreement has been concluded, Croatian providers may apply 
different prices than for persons socially insured in Croatia),83 provid-
ing information on providers, patients’ rights, contact points, complaints 
procedures, mechanisms for seeking remedies and professional liability 
insurance.
4 Conclusion
The Patient Mobility Directive has evolved as a result of the juris-
prudence of the Court of Justice, which has applied the internal market 
rules of the TFEU to situations in which a person accesses healthcare in 
a Member State which is not his/her state of social protection. However, 
the result of the legislative procedure has not followed the approach of 
the Court of Justice literally. Although, in some instances, the Directive 
enhances patients’ rights to reimbursement of healthcare abroad (con-
cerning unplanned healthcare) and improves the framework for patients 
to access healthcare abroad, the additional grounds for imposing prior 
authorisation, possibilities to refuse reimbursement, and additional op-
portunities for Member States to limit the range of covered healthcare 
and to limit the rules on reimbursement, signiﬁ cantly weaken patients’ 
legal position and are thus counterproductive in facilitating patients’ 
movement across national borders. Furthermore, the Directive has add-
ed to the complexity of the legal regulation of cross-border healthcare, 
since several parallel legal routes are now in existence covering the same 
area. These are the areas where the Directive’s adoption may prove to be 
counterproductive, by making it harder for patients to obtain socially 
covered (reimbursed) healthcare outside their state of social protection 
when compared to the co-ordination rules and case law on free move-
ment. The Court of Justice should use its future case law to clarify the 
relevant legal framework.
The Croatian example emphasises some of the problems stemming 
from the Patient Mobility Directive’s provisions on the reimbursement of 
healthcare obtained outside one’s state of social protection. These prob-
lems deal with the range of reimbursed healthcare obtained abroad, pri-
or authorisation necessary for the patients to obtain that reimbursement 
and the possibilities for national authorities to limit the application of 
reimbursement rules in certain instances. On the other hand, Croatia’s 
legal framework will strengthen some patients’ entitlements, provided 
83  See Health Insurance Institute of Croatia, ‘What you should know about the usage of 
health care services during temporary stay in the Republic of Croatia’ <http://www.hzzo-
net.hr/03_03_05_eng.php> accessed 20 September 2012.
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the Directive is correctly transposed into the national setting. Possibili-
ties to access healthcare abroad without prior authorisation, abolishing 
the special contribution for treatments obtained abroad, and making 
Croatian healthcare providers part of the European reference networks, 
are some of the gains for Croatian (covered) patients from the Directive’s 
future implementation in their country.
Finally, although the Directive’s effects in terms of patients’ entitle-
ments to social cover remain ambivalent, there are some additional gains 
from its adoption. These gains concern a step in the direction of resolving 
the structural problems of national healthcare systems by means of co-
operation and the Union supporting Member States’ healthcare policies. 
In terms of these developments, the Directive provides a push in the di-
rection of a more active EU role in the area of healthcare. It seems this 
Union role will, to a large extent, be present within the realm of help and 
guidance in complementing national healthcare policies, since Member 
States retain the freedom to deﬁ ne and organise their social security 
healthcare systems.

